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SYSTEM-GENERATED DIGITAL FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE IN GRAPHIC DESIGN 
APPLICATIONS 
 
Enos Mabuto 
and 
Hein Venter 
University of Pretoria 
South Africa 
ABSTRACT 
Graphic design applications are often used for the editing and design of digital 
art. The same applications can be used for creating counterfeit documents such 
as identity documents (IDs), driver’s licences, passports, etc. However, the use 
of any graphic design application leaves behind traces of digital information 
that can be used during a digital forensic investigation. Current digital forensic 
tools examine a system to find digital evidence, but they do not examine a 
system specifically for the creating of counterfeit documents created through 
the use of graphic design applications.  
The paper in hand reviews the system-generated digital forensic evidence 
gathered from certain graphic design applications, which indicates that a 
counterfeit document was created. This inference is made by associating the 
digital forensic information gathered with the possible actions taken, more 
specifically, the scanning, editing, saving and printing of counterfeit 
documents. The digital forensic information is gathered by analysing the files 
generated by the particular graphic design application used for creating the 
document. The acquired digital forensic information is corroborated to the 
creation of counterfeit documents and interpreted accordingly. In the end 
determining if a system was utilised for counterfeiting. 
Keywords: Digital evidence, Digital forensic, Digital forensic artifacts, 
Graphic design applications. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Industries including but not limited to advertising, newspaper printing, 
architecture, fashion and design, project management and manufacturing make 
use of graphic designs for their corporations. Graphic design applications have 
enhancing tools like paint brushing, vector drawing, digital pen and pencil 
drawing, and many more. These graphic design applications are used to 
facilitate the creation of unique art for company logos, magazine advertising or 
computer-aided design, to mention but a few. Most industries make use of 
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graphic design applications for visual presentations and use pictorial 
expressions that aid communication and the expression of ideas.  
Forged or counterfeit documents are, however, encountered and in circulation 
all over the world. The same graphic design applications used in modern 
industry can also be used for illegitimate purposes like creating counterfeit 
documents. Due to the exceptional editing and design capabilities of these 
applications they can easily be exploited and misused to create counterfeit 
documents like IDs, passports or drivers licences. According to a newspaper 
report by Ilham Rawoot of the Mail & Guardian, terrorist’s target fake South 
African passports because of the ease with which they can be faked. Criminal 
activities such as these confirm the need for digital forensic investigations.  
Similar digital forensic papers have been published that identify image forgery 
or tampered images. However, not much has been done in such research to 
identify whether a specific system was used during a counterfeiting exercise. 
Therefore, if no evidence is available for proving that a counterfeited document 
exists, counterfeiting criminals can potentially get away with it. It is, thus, 
relevant to examine a system specifically for the potential existence of 
counterfeit documents. 
The use of graphic design applications leaves behind traces that can be 
revealed during a digital forensic investigation. A digital forensic investigation 
generally consists of the following phases consisting of the acquisition, 
examination, analysis and reporting (U.S. National Institute of Justice, 2001). 
Assuming that an individual is suspected of creating counterfeit documents, the 
regular process of acquisition is followed. The phases of acquisition and 
reporting are generally similar in different cases; hence the emphasis is on the 
examination and analysis phases.  
This paper identifies the digital traces left behind when certain graphic design 
applications had been used. This is achieved by associating the possible actions 
taken during document creation with the traces left behind. The source of 
potential evidence referred to above equates to the results of possible actions 
(i.e., document scanning, editing, saving and printing) taken during document 
creation. Most of this evidence would originate from the application log files, 
referred to as system-generated evidence. 
 The work covered in this paper continues from previously-published work by 
the authors on “User-generated digital forensic evidence from graphic design 
applications”. The mentioned paper elaborates on gathering potential evidence 
on the actual files with counterfeit value created by the counterfeiter 
intentionally. As opposed to the previous paper, the focus of this paper is on 
the files generated by the graphic design application itself, mostly for the 
purpose of metadata that would hold potential evidence. Another similar paper 
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published by the authors titled “Finding digital evidence from graphic design 
applications”, presented digital evidence on a high level.  
To address the problem, the authors focus on identifying the digital forensic 
information that shows whether a document was created through the mentioned 
four actions. In doing so, a link with the potential criminal may be established. 
However, it is not the aim of this paper to link the crime to an actual person but 
merely to establish that a counterfeit document was indeed created.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section two starts off with 
some background on digital forensics, followed by a brief discussion on 
graphic design applications. Section three presents the system-generated digital 
forensic evidence gathered by means of two experiments, while Section four is 
an evaluation and discussion of the evidence extracted from the graphic design 
applications. Section five serves as conclusion to this paper.  
2. BACKGROUND 
In Part A, the authors discuss the studied literature on digital forensics, 
followed by an explanation of digital evidence and a definition of digital 
forensic artifacts. Part B contains a brief discussion of the three Adobe graphic 
design applications used for the purposes of this study. 
2.1 Digital Forensics 
At the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, digital 
forensics was defined as the use of scientifically derived and proven methods 
toward the preservation, collection, validation, identification, analysis, 
interpretation, documentation and presentation of digital evidence derived from 
digital sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of 
events found to be criminal, or helping to anticipate unauthorised actions 
shown to be disruptive to planned operations. To reconstruct and understand 
what happened on a system in the past, data has to be gathered and analysed in 
a transparent manner.  
A digital forensic investigation focuses on finding digital evidence when a 
computer or network security incident has occurred, or locating data from 
systems that may form part of some litigation, even if such data has been 
deleted. In this context, evidence is critical and any items that can be 
considered to be of evidential value should be identified and collected (Jones 
and Valli, 2008). Computer evidence or digital evidence is defined as any 
hardware, software or data that can be used to prove one or more of the ‘who, 
what, when, where, why and how’ questions pertaining to a security incident 
(Solomon, Barrett, and Broom, 2005). Computer evidence furthermore consists 
of digital files and their contents that are left behind after an incident. Casey 
defined digital evidence as any data that can be used to establish that a crime 
was committed or that can prove a link between a crime and its victim or an 
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offender. Digital evidence consists entirely of sequences of binary values 
called bits (Cohan, 2010). It is important to keep in mind, however, that the 
evidence should be presented in its logical form in court or at a disciplinary 
hearing. 
Traces left behind from the use of an application or operating systems are 
referred to as digital forensic artifacts (Altheide and Carvey, 2011). An 
examiner reveals the truth of an event by discovering and exposing the 
remnants of the event that have been left on the system. Because of the loaded 
legal connotations binding the term ‘evidence’, the term ‘artifacts’ is preferably 
used instead to refer to these remnants. When a perpetrator tries to remove 
these artifacts, it potentially leaves other artifacts behind. For example, in 
trying to remove log files from a system, one typically might use a removal 
tool, which leaves additional traces indicating that a log removal tool was used. 
The scattered evidence inside a system can indicate what has happened for a 
particular digital forensic investigation.  
Application artifacts left by installed applications can be an excellent source of 
potential evidence when performing an analysis. An artifact, however, does not 
become evidence unless its ability to prove a fact has been established 
(Zelkowitz, 2009). Hence it is necessary to reconstruct events that occurred by 
gathering all the possible digital information from a system.  
The amount of research and development that has been undertaken in this field 
has not, to date, focused on the skills and of graphic design software, which is 
a particular area that is nearly always exploited for the purpose of creating 
counterfeit documents and images. Most research work that has been 
undertaken up till now has concentrated on image forensics, which is the kind 
of investigation that is able to determine whether or not an image as been 
forged or tempered.  
Lien, proposed a method that uses a pre-calculated resampling weighting table 
to detect periodic properties in error distribution within an image. The errors in 
the distribution within an image are used to determine if the image has been 
forged. Stamm proposed a method to detect contrast enhancement and addition 
of noise in jpeg compression images. Changes in contrast and noise within an 
image are determined through the use of an algorithm that calculates pixel 
values within the image. The values are then used to detect forgery within the 
image.  Cohen proposed a method that determines characteristics associated 
within digital still camera images to determine the origin of the image. The 
characteristics are compared to the exact replicas and derivates of other 
statistical images to detect forgery. These, and other related work focus on 
determining forgery using statistical data within the image. 
Very little of the research carried out to date has specifically investigated the 
ways and means in which documents are counterfeited. These ways also 
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include the methods and procedures that can be used to detect such activities 
from graphic design applications, which is the focus of this paper. 
How and where evidence is located differs, depending on the crime being 
investigated, the platform (operating systems) and the application used to 
commit the crime. 
2.2 Graphic Design Applications 
Of the many graphic design applications currently available in the industry, 
Adobe Systems Incorporated is regarded as the largest software maker in the 
graphic design software category (Bloomberg News, 2011) and hence the 
reason for focussing on graphic design software from Adobe Systems for this 
research. Adobe Systems Incorporated owns software technologies that are 
used for online transactions, business applications and social technologies. The 
case study for the current research was therefore conducted with Adobe 
graphic design applications, namely Photoshop and In-Design.  
3. DIGITAL FORENSIC EVIDENCE GATHERED FROM GRAPHIC 
DESIGN APPLICATIONS 
In this section, the authors start off by explaining the research method used in 
this study to create the counterfeit documents, referred to as the experiments. 
Secondly the authors illustrate the results obtained from the experiments, 
referred to as the gathered digital forensic artifacts. A summary elaborating on 
the results concludes this section. 
3.1 Experiments 
‘System-generated digital forensic artifacts’ refer to those artifacts created by 
the application without direct user intervention, while ‘user-generated digital 
forensic artifacts’ refer to artifacts intentionally and directly created by the 
user. The latter are not analysed in this paper. 
The research experiments were conducted in two stages. The first experiment 
was conducted to simulate the activities that can be performed by an offender 
and is referred to as the 'counterfeiter experiment'. The second experiment was 
carried out to trace the activities of the offender and is referred to as the 
'investigator experiment'. An explanation of the two experiments follows.  
3.1.1 Counterfeiter Experiment: Creating the Counterfeit Documents 
The researcher created approximately three hundred dummy counterfeit 
documents by using the graphic design applications that were discussed earlier 
in this text. The motivation behind the creation of approximately three hundred 
documents is as follows. These documents were created during the experiment 
by editing the following four components within a South African Identity 
Document (ID), passport and drivers license: the barcode, fingerprints, 
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signatures, and photographs of human faces. This required a combination of 
twenty four options (4! (Factorial)= 24) on eleven examined file types. The 
combination for all file types equalled two hundred and sixty four (24 x 11), 
and included a few extra repetitions for clarity, yielding almost three hundred 
documents. This was so that the authors could be able to notice the difference 
or the changes to the digital forensic artifacts as more documents are created. 
Different application versions usually bring about more application capabilities 
and enhanced digital tools which can result in potential changes to digital 
forensic artifacts. These changes will be explained later in the results section.  
Since most graphic design application users prefer the latest editions, the most 
recent version of Adobe, CS5, was used for this study as the base experiment. 
Further experiments were carried out on CS3 and CS4 for comparative 
purposes. Three different computers were used, each with a different Adobe 
version installed on it. The counterfeit documents were created by performing 
the actions mentioned before (scanning, editing, saving and printing). The 
‘platform’ refers to the operating system on which the counterfeit documents 
were created. According to software reviews in 2011, the Windows operating 
system is still ranked most popular and the analysis of digital forensic artifacts 
was consequently conducted on a Windows 7 platform. 
3.1.2 Investigator Experiment: Searching for the Evidence 
Once the counterfeit documents had been created, experiments were carried out 
to search for pertinent evidence left behind from the use of the graphic design 
applications. The operating systems’ registry editor tool, ‘regedit’ was used to 
search for associated registry entries, while a hex editor, Winhex was used for 
analysing the binary data of the log files.  
To respond to the problem stated earlier, that there are no digital forensic 
investigation software tools available yet to investigate crimes where graphic 
design applications can be used for creating counterfeit documents; four 
possible actions taken during the creation of a document were used as a 
hypothesis to gather digital forensic information related to the graphic design 
applications. The analysis is formulated to find the digital forensic information 
that indicates that the actions (scanning, editing, saving and printing) had 
indeed taken place. By tracking the actions performed, an investigator is able 
to conduct a systematic investigation aimed at acquiring not only the files used 
to create the document, but also the actual documents created to be used as 
potential evidence. For example, if the document was scanned, then the next 
step would probably be that it was edited. If never scanned then probably it 
was edited only. In the end, it becomes possible to state if the document 
created was a counterfeit document or not. 
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If none of the four actions were taken, then there is no need to ascertain 
whether the application was used for document creation. An illustration of the 
results from the experiments follows.  
3.2 Results from the Experiments: Gathered Digital Forensic Artifacts 
The discussion that follows highlights the digital forensic artifacts found in 
graphic design applications where the source of the potential evidence is 
mainly system-generated and results derive mostly from application log files.  
Experimental results obtained from digital forensic artifacts related to the four 
actions (scan, edit, save and print) are elaborated on in each of the subsections 
to follow. 
3.2.1 Artifacts Related to Document Scanning  
Generally, when one attempts to create a fraudulent document, an original 
document has to be acquired to imitate or copy its identity. Scanning is a 
common option that results in the original document being available on 
computer for digital editing. The different models of scanners that are currently 
available use various software packages for executing scan commands. For the 
purposes of this research, the focus is therefore on commands generated from 
within the graphic design application and used for editing the scanned 
document.  
Adobe Photoshop has the capability to scan a document using the ‘import WIA 
support’ document menu option. The document scanned is loaded into a 
destination folder as prompted. The application creates a folder, saves the 
scanned image and opens the scanned image in the application.  
After a document is scanned, the application records the digital artifact 
(evidence for scanning) into one of its log files named Adobe Photoshop CSX 
Prefs.psp located in C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Adobe\Adobe 
Photoshop CSX\Adobe Photoshop CSX Settings. The X in CSX represents the 
version of the graphic design application, which can be 3, 4 or 5. After the 
authors analysed this psp log file, they identified an entry recorded of the 
location of the scanned file at certain address offsets to be discussed in the  
Section 3.3 summary. Through examining this location, the authors were able 
to identify the copies of the original documents scanned for possible 
counterfeiting.  
Adobe In-Design is not capable of scanning a document. In this case, if the 
application used cannot scan a document. Then the user could use the scanners 
own software, this means that the scanned document will be loaded into the 
application through the “place” function. As long as the application user has 
inserted the scanned document into the graphic design application, it is 
possible to trace the particular image inserted as shall be described in the sub 
section “artifacts related to document editing”.  Even if not all actions are 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(3) 
78 
exercised(scan, edit, save and print), the traces obtained from any recognised 
actions are used to determine, for example what was inserted in the document 
and what the saved document created is. This would enable an investigator to 
visualise these aspects and determine if a counterfeit document was created.  
After scanning, the regular process followed by a potential criminal is to edit 
the acquired document in a bid to falsify its content. This editing process is 
discussed in the next section.  
3.2.2 Artifacts Related to Document Editing  
Document editing is one of the important stages of creating a counterfeit 
document as it allows one to insert objects of interest. For example, a human 
face, a bar code or a fingerprint can be inserted in the scanned document. A 
number of editing actions can be performed, including typing, colouring or 
drawing. Our focus is on editing by insertion of an image or object, as this can 
later be used to determine if the document created was counterfeit or not. 
Regarding inserted objects, experiments were executed to establish what can be 
inferred from a system that indicates to the examiner what was inserted and 
from which location it was inserted. The terms ‘inserting’, ‘attaching’ or 
‘placing’ an image are considered to refer to the same action, though called 
differently in various applications. In this paper, the term ‘inserting’ is used 
henceforth.  
The same log file, Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, records digital information 
with the name of the inserted file and the location from which it was 
inserted.  
Adobe In-Design can also perform the action of inserting an image into a 
document. In-Design log files consist of FindChangeData, FontMaskCache, 
In_DesignDragDrop and idletask. This application records digital artifacts for 
editing entries into one of its log files. The log file named InDesign SavedData 
(without a file extension), which is located at C:\Users\ <username>\ 
AppData\Local\Adobe\ InDesign\Version 5.0\Cache, contains the information 
that indicates the name of the location from which an image was inserted. 
Unlike Adobe Photoshop, Adobe In-Design only records the folder location 
or the path of the inserted images, and not the full name of the inserted 
image. 
From these locations, the authors were able to obtain the actual images used 
during document editing, for example, images of a human face and fingerprint 
images. These images are essentially necessary for counterfeit investigations as 
they can be used for compare to the images within the suspect counterfeit 
document. 
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3.2.3 Artifacts Related to Document Saving  
Once a document has been edited, the user (or potential criminal) usually needs 
to save it either for later printing or further editing. In this section the authors 
examine what is found in the system relating to saved documents. This 
information is vital as it can point to an examiner the name of the potentially 
fraudulent saved file and where the file was saved to. If the file was deleted or 
moved, search commands can also be generated based on the names of the files 
saved. This is done by specifying the name of the file when searching, thereby 
extending the search filter or search domain during an investigation.  
Adobe Photoshop log file records the digital artifacts that indicate saving 
entries. The same log file, Adobe Photoshop CSX Prefs, contains information 
about the name, location and type of the saved file.  
The log file InDesign SavedData contains information about the name and 
type of the file that has been saved, as well as the location to which the file 
was saved.  
In both cases, the names are arranged in order of the last saved file first. From 
this information the authors managed to obtain the documents created by the 
graphic design application and recognise the ones which are counterfeit 
documents.  
Adobe Photoshop records both the name of the ‘saving folder’ location and the 
full name of the saved file. The name of the ‘saving folder’ is recorded in the 
beginning of the log file, while the entry with the names of the saved files 
appears towards the middle of the log file. It is noted that the log file records a 
maximum of 22 entries of saved files. As more files are saved, the log file 
overwrites the older entries with new entries. Adobe In-Design records an 
unlimited number of saved documents. 
The digital artifacts for saved documents can be verified or compared to the 
registry entries. Values for the visited directories are acquired from the registry 
key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\ Software \Adobe\Photoshop\<version 
#>\VisitedDirs. Generally, saved files from any graphic design application can 
also be verified or checked by looking at recent documents available in folder 
C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\ Microsoft\Windows\Recent.  
3.2.4 Artifacts Related to Document Printing 
Printing is one of the last stages of counterfeit document creation. A user might 
need to create a hard copy of the edited document so that it can be used in a 
physical environment. Unlike scanning actions, printing actions can be 
commanded from all the graphic design applications in question via the print 
menu command. The artifacts illustrated in this section are valid for any of the 
examined graphic design applications. To locate which printer(s) are used to 
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print a document, one uses the registry entries below. The registry keys from 
which a list of printer connections can be established are the following: 
(1)HKLM\soft\Adobe\Photoshop\11.0\Plugin path. 
(2) HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Prin
ters       
(3) HKEY_USERS\\<username>\\Software\Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVer
sion\PrinterPorts (4) HKEY_USERS\<username>\Software\Microsoft\ 
Installer\Products\<productid>\SourceList 
After establishing the names of the printers from the above, the physical 
existence of the printers can be verified. This usually assists an investigator in 
cases where the actual printers have been removed. Physical printers are 
necessary in an investigation so as to match the digital evidence to the actual 
printer for supporting a case during court proceedings.  
For each print job, two spool files are generated by the operating system 
located in C:\Windows\System32\spool\ PRINTERS. The first is XXXXX.shd 
and the second is XXXXX.spl, where XXXXX represents the job number in 
decimal format. Analysing the binary data of these files indicates the name of 
the spooled document. Additionally, print jobs that were queued to print but 
have not actually been printed yet can also be found within print spools. Table 
1 shows the recognised printing artifacts including examples.  
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Table 1 Address Offsets for Printed Documents 
Recognised 
printing 
artifact 
Spool file 
containing 
artifact 
Address 
offset for 
recognised 
artifact (in 
HEX) 
Example 
Name of 
printed 
document 
spl 0X20 Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd 
Name of 
printer 
shd 0X88 HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL 
Name of 
printer 
(repeat) 
shd 0X3B0 HP Laserjet 2605_2605dnPCL 
Name of the 
application 
that 
generated 
the print 
request 
shd 0X2120 Adobe Photoshop CS5 
Username 
and name of 
file 
shd 0X2400 Robert_graphics_editor. 
Johnstone_passport_final_edit.psd 
 
The column and row headings for Table 1 are briefly explained for the sake of 
clarity. Recognised printing artifact is the name of the digital artifact obtained 
from the stated print spool file (column Spool file containing artifact). Address 
offset for recognised artifact represents the address pointer in hexadecimal 
format for the digital artifact, pointing to the named artifact contained in the 
spool file. Example is an example of a digital artifact for the recognised 
printing artifact. Name of printer is the address offset where an entry of the 
name of the printer that generated the print job can be found, and this entry is 
repeated at another place in the shd spool file as shown in the second column 
Name of printer (repeat). The reason for this repetition is not known, however, 
as far as digital forensic evidence is concerned, the repetition merely confirms 
again that the printer that was indeed used. Name of the application that 
generated the print request is the offset of the name of the application that 
generated the print job. Username and name of file is the address offset of the 
name of the user that generated the print job and the name of the printed 
potential counterfeit document (evidence for printing).  
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3.3 Summary 
A log file may consist of thousands of pages of binary data, of which only 
a few pages will contain the required digital forensic artifacts, which, in 
addition, may be scattered throughout these few pages. Figure 1 shows an 
example of an Adobe log file, indicating a path recognised for scanned 
documents. 
One can use a hex editor to scroll, for example, approximately 60% down the 
log file consisting of thousands of pages to reveal the evidence that is required. 
This can result in wasting too much time and, ultimately, running the risk that 
critical evidence being omitted from the search. 
Figure 1 Graphic Design Application Log File Containing 16980 Pages 
 Another reason for recognising the locations of digital forensic information is 
that the digital forensic artifacts from the log files do not make use of evidence 
identifiers such as prefixes and tags. (Evidence identifiers are discussed in the 
previously mentioned paper by the authors) In other words, the investigator 
does not know what to search for using keyword searching. The chart 
presented in this section guide the investigator to look for this evidence at a 
pre-determined location, for example, about six tenths (or three fifths) down 
the file. It is therefore necessary to identify the location of this information 
by making use of radar chart in order to pinpoint where the evidence can be 
found within the log file. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the digital 
forensic artifacts within the Photoshop psp log file. 
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Figure 2 A Graphic Illustration of Digital Artifacts  
Distribution in a Photoshop Log File 
The chart in Figure 2 shows that the digital forensic artifacts are located mostly 
in the middle of the log file for any action. In this chart, the centre represents 
the beginning of the log file represented by a 0 and the outer edges represent 
the end of the log file represented by a 1. The numbers one to fifty represent 
the number of counterfeit documents created. Such a chart helps the examiner 
to appreciate that they can access most of the information at the same location 
inside a log file. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of digital forensic artifacts 
within the log file, Indesign Save data. 
 
Figure 3 A Graphic Illustration of Digital Artifacts  
Distribution in an Adobe In-Design Log File 
CS3 Edit &
Scan
CS4 Edit &
Scan
CS5 Edit &
Scan
CS3 save
Photoshop log 
file digital 
forensic artifacts 
distribution 
0 - 50 ...# of Documents 
created 
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The radar chart (figure 3) shows that most digital forensic artifacts from the 
Adobe In-Design log file are located towards the end of the file. Some, 
however, are scattered all over the file from the beginning until the end. It can 
be recognised that the radar charts do not contain printing distribution; this is 
because the printing artifacts outlined in Section 3.2.4 are fixed address offsets 
as displayed in Table 1. 
Based on the experiments conducted in this study, the authors managed to 
establish the locations to which scanned documents were saved. In these 
locations one could discover several other counterfeit documents that were 
scanned. In respect of the action of editing, the authors established the names, 
file types and file locations of inserted objects. By tracking the latter, the actual 
insertions were recognised by means of fingerprints and human face images 
inserted into the counterfeit documents. The saving action enabled the 
researchers to recognise potential digital evidence that reveal the location of 
the actual counterfeit documents created. The printing action exposed registry 
and spool files that revealed the names of the printers that had been used for 
document printing, as well as the names of those documents printed. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Given that a digital forensic investigation was initiated into a suspected 
counterfeit document creation crime, and given that the document was 
generated using a graphic design application, a digital forensic examiner can 
use the identified digital forensic artifacts to establish the route along which the 
document was created and corroborate the gathered evidence. For example, the 
digital forensic examiner is able to discover the human face, fingerprint, and/or 
bar code images that were used to create the counterfeit document. The 
inserted image can then be compared to match the image in the suspected 
counterfeit document. Such evidence can be presented in a court of law for 
prosecution. Presenting proof of the actions taken during the process of 
document tampering (scanning, editing, saving and printing) provides valuable 
support when a case of counterfeit document creation is brought before the 
court as evidence indicating how the document was created and what entities 
were used to create the document. In the end, determining if the system was 
used for counterfeiting purposes. 
These results are essential for a digital forensic examiner to find and locate 
digital evidence related to the creation of counterfeit documents. This increases 
the transparency and reliability of the investigation process in cases where the 
crime tool was a graphic design application. 
5. CONCLUSION 
As mentioned before, that previously-published work, i.e., user-generated 
digital forensic evidence in graphic design applications, involves detecting a 
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counterfeit document directly created by the user. That research lead to another 
question whether there exist system-generated evidence indirectly created by a 
system rather than directly created by a user, which then led to this paper, 
which identifies if a system was used for counterfeiting purposes. 
The gathering of system-generated digital forensic evidence is effective in 
addressing cases where counterfeit document editing is largely associated with 
particular graphic design applications. Although this approach addresses only 
case studies involving Adobe products, the same can be done for other graphic 
design applications and for many other types of applications. A shortcoming of 
the approach is, however, that it does not tackle issues where the user only 
edits a hard copy, or scans and prints without using any pre-installed graphic 
design application. Another drawback of this approach is the fact that this 
exercise needs to be carried out on all new graphic design applications in order 
to detect where exactly potential evidence can be found within such a new 
graphic design application.  
The techniques discussed in this paper can, however, be incorporated in 
commercial digital forensic tools like FTK or Encase, or it can possibly be 
used in the design of a new digital forensic investigation tool capable of 
specifically detecting counterfeit document creation. For example, a tool can be 
created similar to the ‘porn detection stick’ created by Paraben, which is a 
thumb drive device that scans and detects pornographic content on a computer. 
Future research can include administering this process to other graphic design 
applications such as CorelDraw and also to other types of applications that 
could similarly be used to commit digital document fraud. 
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